Liquidity is the most misunderstood asset in digital markets. It looks like a metric and behaves like a relationship: it exists because someone with inventory has decided to commit it, and it disappears when that decision changes. Design work that ignores this produces venues with impressive volume and no durable market.
We design the whole ecosystem — which market makers and venues, on what commercial terms, against what inventory and treasury position, and with what incentive structure. Then we test it: what happens to the spread, the depth and the price when the incentives stop.
The engagement suits exchanges building an order book, protocols needing secondary-market depth, and issuers who need their token to trade credibly rather than merely list.
- Your venue shows volume that depends on rebates and falls away without them.
- You are listing a token and need credible secondary-market depth rather than a listing alone.
- Treasury holdings and market-making commitments have never been planned together.
- Spread and depth are poor relative to comparable venues and you cannot explain why.
Liquidity is contractual
Depth exists because of agreements — with market makers, treasury holders and venues. Those agreements, not the dashboard, are what you are actually designing.
Treasury is the inventory
Market-making commitments and listing obligations require tokens or currency to be available. Treasury policy and liquidity strategy are the same discussion.
Test without the subsidy
Incentive-driven volume collapses when the incentives end. We model the unsubsidised market, because that is the business you are actually building.
- Market-structure and liquidity assessment, benchmarked against comparable venues
- Market-maker and liquidity-provider strategy with commercial terms
- Treasury policy for inventory, vesting and market-making commitments
- Incentive and rebate design tested for unsubsidised durability
- Listing, venue and counterparty roadmap
- Monitoring framework and terms of reference for liquidity providers
- 01
Assess the market
Where your liquidity actually comes from, what it costs and what it would look like if the incentives stopped today.
- 02
Design the commitments
Market-maker agreements, obligations, spreads and depth targets — written so performance can be measured and enforced.
- 03
Align the treasury
Inventory, vesting and available float reconciled with the commitments that have been made.
- 04
Build durable incentives
Reward structures designed to attract genuine flow rather than to manufacture volume.
- 05
Monitor and adjust
Ongoing measurement against the commitments, with periodic renegotiation as the market matures.
Liquidity and market-structure read
A written diagnosis of where your liquidity comes from, what it costs and how durable it is.
Ecosystem design programme
Market-maker strategy, treasury policy and incentives designed and negotiated as one system.
Market-maker negotiation support
Structuring and negotiating specific liquidity-provider agreements, including performance terms.
- Venues seeking wash volume or manufactured activity to present to an exchange, an investor or a listing committee.
- Projects with no treasury or inventory to commit — a liquidity strategy without inventory is a wish.
Enough to support the spreads and depth your users expect in the pairs that matter, which is generally far more than first-time issuers estimate. Rather than quoting a figure, we work from the trading experience you need and derive the inventory and commitments that deliver it.
They can be, when they specify measurable obligations — spread, uptime, depth within a band, and remedies for underperformance. Vague agreements that merely promise "reasonable liquidity" are the reason so many arrangements are not delivered.
By designing the incentive structure so that it rewards flow that would exist anyway at a better price, and by measuring unsubsidised depth. If the market only exists because you are paying for both sides, you do not have a market; you have a cost centre.
Especially to those. Planning the market structure, the treasury position and the market-maker arrangements before a listing avoids the common situation where a token lists into no depth and trades badly from day one — a first impression that is very hard to reverse.